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DUBIOUS DOCTRINES: THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION
Linda S. Mullenix*
The court here is faced with a procedural invention of unknown origin
which bears a remarkable resemblance to the class action and which has
engendered considerable controversy in the context of this case.1

I. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, the term ―quasi-class action‖ has been
appearing with increasing, uncritical frequency in a spate of federal
court decisions.2 While it may be premature to characterize these
sporadic references as a trend,3 it is perhaps soon enough to call
attention to the misuse of loose labels that carry with them significant
consequences. Before the quasi-class action gains any further traction,
there are several valid reasons for definitively quashing this quasi.4
Three simple points about the quasi-class action. First, there is no
such thing as a quasi-class action. A quasi-class action brings to mind
the old joke about being slightly pregnant. Hence, either you are a class
action, or you are not. There is no constitutional, statutory, doctrinal, or
other basis for the quasi-class action. The label quasi-class action is a
convenient, lazy fabrication to justify the lawless administration of
aggregate claims.
Second, whatever historical antecedents or analogues may exist for
the concept of a quasi-class action, the 1966 amendments to Rule 235
the Supreme Court‘s decisions in Amchem6 and Ortiz,7 and multiple
class actions decisions lay to rest any notions of a quasi-class action.

* Morris and Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, The University of Texas School of Law.
1. Fla. Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690, 692 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
2. A Westlaw search in the ―Allfeds‖ database of the term ―quasi-class action,‖ in February
2011, located sixty-eight federal cases citing the term.
3. But see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing
Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 116 (2010) (characterizing
the newly-created quasi-class action as an ―emerging doctrine that MDLs are ‗quasi-class actions,‖ and
endorsing expanded judicial powers for MDL judges managing such quasi-class actions. Cf. In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 643 n.4 (E.D. La. 2010) (rejecting the suggestion by
Professor Silver and Miller that attorneys in MDL proceedings should select the Plaintiffs‘ Steering
Committee with the attorney with the largest number of cases having the laboring oar: ―But the
experience of MDL courts suggest otherwise.‖).
4. The quasi-class action should perhaps be interred with its remote doctrinal cousin, quasi in
rem jurisdiction. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (outlining the federal class action rule).
6. Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
7. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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The entire point of the class action rule is not only to supply an
aggregate mechanism for efficiently resolving multiple claims, but also
to balance efficiency values with the due process protection of absent
class members in representative litigation. The so-called quasi-class
action is the antithesis of due process. The quasi-class action is a
jurisprudential oxymoron that its proponents deploy to justify the
expeditious resolution of aggregate claims, while failing to adequately
protect the interests of claimants.
Third, the quasi-class action ought to be repudiated as an unfortunate
drift into further lawlessness in administering aggregate claims.8 Over
the past thirty years, actors involved in resolving aggregate claims—
especially aggregate tort claims—have embraced claims-resolution
models that allow malefactors to control, manage, and settle their
liabilities on highly preferential terms, permit plaintiffs‘ attorneys to
reap bountiful and often excessive fees, and enable heroic judges (and
their heroic surrogates) to clear their dockets of large numbers of cases.
The interests of powerful, well-funded, and self-interested actors have
tacitly converged to support a de facto collusive model of aggregateclaims resolution. In the past three decades, federal courts—including
the Supreme Court—have rejected collusive backroom aggregate
settlement deals that do not adequately protect the interests of class
members. In response, and in order to be free of formal class action
constraints, self-interested actors on both sides of the docket have coopted the federal multidistrict litigation procedure (MDL) 9 to provide a
staging-ground for the private resolution of aggregate claims. The most
extreme variant of private aggregate claims resolution, completely
outside the scrutiny of judicial management and review, is exemplified
by fund approaches to mass-claims resolution—most recently the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility.
In the judicial arena, there are good reasons why mass litigation
lawyers now love MDL procedure, whereas they eschewed this
mechanism in the past. Because the formal class action rule became an
inconvenient impediment to resolving aggregate claims favorably to
both plaintiff and defense interests, actors involved in mass litigation
now promote MDL procedure and the quasi-class action concept as an
entirely useful, creative legal fiction to accomplish self-interested goals.
It is not at all surprising that self-interested negotiators and some
federal MDL judges have embraced the concept of the quasi-class action
as the most effective means to resolve massive liabilities. Since 2005
private actors have evolved the nearly perfect model for accomplishing

8. See generally THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3 (2010).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006).
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self-dealing agreements by manipulating MDL procedure to accomplish
ends this mechanism was never intended to perform. Hence, resolving
mass claims under MDL auspices and the penumbra of the quasi-class
action effectively does an end-run around the class action rule, and
liberates deal-makers from having to adequately protect the interests of
injured claimants.
The deployment of MDL jurisdiction, with the quasi-class action
fiction engrafted onto MDL procedure, has stripped away protections
afforded by class action requirements. Mass litigation actors may now
settle complex cases largely unconstrained by law. What the class
action bar could not achieve through decades of judicial decisions—
such as elimination of the need for an adequate class representative—
has effectively been achieved through adroit manipulation of MDL
procedure and the ministrations of selected heroic judges and their
special masters.
Before the inspired fabrication of the quasi-class action, global
agreements accomplished under MDL auspices had to be settled
pursuant to formal class requirements and due process protections. By
engrafting the label quasi-class action onto MDL procedure, selfinterested actors have created a perfect staging ground for negotiating
back-room deals that carry a false aura of judicial legitimacy, liberated
from the constraints of the formal class action rule.
MDL judges, in turn, by endorsing the concept of the quasi-class
action have greatly expanded the scope of their authority and have
become complicit in allowing private parties to accomplish the very
backdoor settlements that the Supreme Court and federal courts have
disallowed for decades. The quasi-class action, then, represents an
ultimate, cynical expression of an aggregate claims-resolution model
that enables self-interested actors to resolve claims in the actors‘ best
interests rather than the interests of injured claimants.
II. THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A QUASI-CLASS ACTION: THE
EMERGENCE OF A DOCTRINAL PHANTASM
A. Documenting the Drift Towards the Quasi-Class Action: A
Fabricated “Trend”?
At first blush, the sheer frequency of federal use of the term quasiclass action would seem to suggest that the quasi-class action is a wellrecognized and well-established doctrine in federal jurisprudence. Since
1946, sixty-eight federal cases have cited the label. However, careful
reading of this case law suggests an entirely different conclusion: the
quasi-class action is a phantasm. None of these cases actually discussed
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the concept of the quasi-class action, and rarely-cited authority is
inapposite or inaccurate.
Of the sixty-eight cases deploying the label quasi-class action, thirtytwo decisions—almost half—are boilerplate, repetitive and selfreferential citations to a single litigation: the Zyprexa products liability
litigation under Judge Jack Weinstein‘s supervision in the Eastern
District of New York.10 The Zyprexa court‘s usage of the quasi-class
action label is discussed below. However, of the fifty-five cases using
the term since 2006, thirty-two were piecemeal orders in the Zyprexa
litigation, which rotely recite that the litigation was conducted as a
quasi-class action. Hence, the label quasi-class action largely has
emerged in the past five years, in one mass tort litigation.
In addition to the thirty-two repetitive Zyprexa decisions, Judge Jack
Weinstein has used the term quasi-class action in five other decisions to
describe aggregate litigation before him;11 three orders involved the
same Staten Island Ferry crash litigation. Hence, of sixty-eight cases
that reference the quasi-class action, thirty-seven are by Judge
Weinstein. Judge Weinstein, then, through sheer force of will and
identical repetition in thirty-two Zyprexa orders and five other cases,
may be credited with bullying the quasi-class action label into judicial
consciousness.
Of the thirty-six non-Zyprexa cases using the term quasi-class action,
none explain what a quasi-class action is or the authoritative support for
such a concept. Instead, the term quasi-class action is more often cited
in passing. For example, a set of cases under the Fair Labor Standards
Act12 refer to the label quasi-class action. The FSLA (Act) provides
10. The original Zyprexa case citation is In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122
(E.D.N.Y. 2006). As discussed later in this Article, there are thirty-two separate decisions and orders in
the ongoing Zyprexa litigation, all which are denominated as ―In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.‖
11. See McMillan v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-2887, 2010 WL 1487738, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 13, 2010) (addressing Staten Island Ferry crash litigation; attorney fee dispute, stating, ―The
benefits of that aspect of this quasi-class action litigation allegedly accrued to hundreds of injured
claimants, including the clients.‖); McMillan v. City of New York, No. CV 08 2887 (JBW)(VVP), 2010
WL 1459218 at *1 (E.D.N.Y. March 4, 2010) (relating the Report and Recommendation of the U.S.
Magistrate on attorney fee dispute; referring to claimant‘s damage award as being comparable in a sense
to a ―quasi-aggregate or quasi-class action‖); McMillan v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-6049, 2008
WL 4287573 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2010) (concerning attorney fee dispute; ―in a sense this was a
quasi aggregate or quasi class action with increased power to control fees.‖) (citing In re Zyprexa Prod.
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New Jersey Inc. v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 162, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing third-party payor litigation
against tobacco company defendant; ―Defendants have not raised the point that, in a sense the class
action or quasi-class action such as the present one, where many claims are aggregated, takes care of the
problem of social payment for the full cost of damages a defendant caused.‖); United States v. Cheung,
952 F. Supp. 148, 148–49) (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (concerning federal restitution action for criminal actions;
―What was in effect a civil quasi-class action is coordinated with a criminal proceeding to assure
maximum recovery by the victims with minimum transactional costs.‖).
12. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (2006) [hereinafter FLSA].
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employees with a private right of action to sue an employer for
violations of the Act ―for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated.‖13 Federal courts have recognized
that the FSLA authorizes collective actions.14
FLSA actions are unique and subject to idiosyncratic statutory
procedures, including opt-in requirements, a two-step certification
procedure, and distinctive discovery rules.15 Federal courts agree that
FSLA lawsuits are not class actions subject to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.16 In discussing FSLA procedure, however, some courts
have noted—with the briefest, passing mention—that the collective
nature of an FSLA lawsuit resembles a quasi-class action.17 In all FSLA
decisions, that is the extent of the reference to the quasi-class action;
FSLA decisions are entirely devoid of doctrinal discussion of the quasiclass action. Instead, the FSLA decisions merely acknowledge the
mimicking effect of one type of statutory procedure for another.
Another series of Mississippi federal cases, in property damage
insurance litigation arising out of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, refer to
the label quasi-class action.18 These brief decisions recognize the quasiclass action for what it actually is: an attempt to accomplish by label
what is otherwise prohibited by doctrine. In 2006, the federal district
court in Mississippi refused to certify three proposed class actions
alleging property damage claims because of the highly individualized
issues that defeated class certification under Rule 23.19 In the aftermath
13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b) (West 2008).
14. Abubakar v. City of Solano, No. CIV S-06-2268 LKK EFB, 2008 WL 508911(E.D. Cal.
Feb. 22, 2008).
15. Id. at *2.
16. Douglas v. GE Energy Reuter Stokes, No. 1:07CV077, 2007 WL 1341779 at *3 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 30, 2007); Highland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CIV04-0711, 2005 WL 3415855 at *1, n.1
(D.N.M. Sept. 15, 2005); Montalto v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 83 F.R.D. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
17. Douglas, 2007 WL 1341779 at *3 (citing Montalto, 83 F.R.D. 150); see also Highland, 2005
WL 3415855 at *1, n.1 (―This type of quasi-class action, governed by the FSLA, does not proceed under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23); Hallas v. Western Electric Co., Inc., No. C-2-79-519, 1981 WL 205 at *2 (S.D.
Ohio 1981); Cowlishaw v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 425 F. Supp. 802, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Swettman v.
Remington Rand, 65 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Ill. 1946).
18. See McFarland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIVA1:06CV466LTS-RHW, 2006 WL
3071988, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2006); McFarland v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV466LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2577852, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2006) (Magistrate Judge‘s Order of
Severance), aff’d, 2006 WL 3071988; Vaz v. Allstate Property & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV481 LTS RHW,
2006 WL 2583733, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2006) (Magistrate‘s Order of Severance); Bradley v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:06CV528-LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2594548, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6,
2006) (Magistrate‘s Order of Severance).
19. See Guice v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06CV1-LTS-RHW, 2006 WL 2359474 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 14, 2006); see also Comer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:05cv436 LTS-RHW, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33123, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2006) (―Each property owner in Mississippi who
had real and personal property damaged in Hurricane Katrina is uniquely situated. No two property
owners will have experienced the same losses. The nature and the extent of the property damage the
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of these rulings, plaintiffs‘ attorneys then filed lawsuits that individually
joined hundreds of plaintiffs‘ claims against various insurance
companies.
When the court sua sponte questioned whether it should sever
individual claims,20 the magistrate recommended severance, noting that
the court recently denied attempts to certify Hurricane Katrina property
damage classes.21 The magistrate presciently recognized the problem
with the plaintiffs‘ creative, renewed end-run around the class action
rule: ―In essence, Plaintiffs have filed what amounts to a quasi-class
action lawsuit but without regard for the rigid requirements for class
certification.‖22
Following the magistrate‘s recommendations, the court recognized
and resisted the lawyers‘ attempts to highjack mass joinder procedure as
a method for accomplishing an end-run around the class action rule. In
adopting the magistrate‘s recommendations, the judge similarly
observed:
It would also be inconsistent for this Court to deny class certification in a
setting where similar broad claims were made and at the same time allow
the instant action to go forward in what the Magistrate accurately
described as a ‗quasi-class action lawsuit but without regard for the rigid
requirements for class certification.23

The remaining grab-bag of cases citing the quasi-class action label are
similarly devoid of doctrinal analysis, but typically represent a court‘s
short-hand description for collective litigation where numerous plaintiffs
are consolidated under simple joinder rules.24 Not only do these cases
owners sustain from the common cause, Hurricane Katrina, will vary in particulars, depending on the
location and condition of the property before the storm struck and depending also on what combination
of forces caused the damage . . . the undersigned [Judge Senter] finds that the same considerations that
applied in Guice and Comer, apply to the instant case as well.‖).
20. McFarland, 2006 WL 2577852, at *1.
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id. at *2 (citing Guice, 2006 WL 2359474). As is typical of citations to the label quasi-class
action, the same magistrate judge repeated this exact identical language in three similar cases.
23. McFarland, 2006 WL 3071988, at *2.
24. See, e.g., Avila v. Willits Env‘t, No. C 99-03941 SI, 2009 WL 4254367, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 24, 2009) (relating to taxing of litigation costs in toxic tort litigation; over 110 plaintiffs
consolidated in one suit; ―the case operated like a quasi-class action), vacated, 633 F.3d 828 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1552, 2011 WL 4530474 (Oct. 3, 2011); United States v. Gallion, 257
F.R.D. 141, 158 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (disqualifying proposed expert; passing reference to attorney Stan
Chesley as an attorney who had participated in ―mass tort quasi class actions); In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05 1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *6 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (considering attorney fees in defibrillator MDL proceeding after settlement;
―Before this Court is a coordinated litigation of many individual yet related cases that effectively is, and
proceeded as, a quasi-class action.‖); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.3288(DLC), 2004
WL 113484, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004) (referencing plaintiffs‘ parallel and vexatious de facto class
action, also labeled as a quasi-class action, without further elaboration); In re Desrosiers, 212 B.R. 716,
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have nothing in common, but none described, endorsed, enlightened, or
otherwise supplied meaningful content to the label of quasi-class action.
B. The Zyprexa Litigation and the Invention of the Quasi-Class Action
It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that Judge Jack Weinstein
single-handedly invented the quasi-class action, and it should come as
little surprise that the term quasi-class action has been given its most
robust voice by Judge Weinstein in his judicial management of the
Zyprexa litigation.25 The Zyprexa litigation involved a complicated
array of lawsuits brought by individual consumers of the
pharmaceutical,26 third-party payors such as unions and health plans,27
725 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (rejecting debtors‘ contention that former lawsuit was a class action or
quasi-class action); Gordon and Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. Physics, 905 F. Supp. 169, 179
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (deciding res judicata; footnote mention of relationship of concepts of virtual
representation, privity, and quasi-class action status; no meaningful discussion); Joseph v. Hage, 121
B.R. 679, 682 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990) (―In addition to the general body of creditors as beneficiaries of
a quasi-class action pursuant to Code § 727(a); no discussion of concept of quasi class action); Fla.
Power Corp. v. Granlund, 82 F.R.D. 690, 694 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (referencing a quasi-class action in
absence of certification under Rule 23); EEOC v. Rexene Polymers Co., MO-74-CA-62, 1975 WL 121
(W.D. Tex. 1975) (standing issue relating to EEOC; ―Although the defendant has raised an academically
interesting class action question, the Court finds it unnecessary to address itself to the issue raised in
regard to whether this suit is properly labeled a class action, quasi-class action, or whatever other label
might be appropriate.‖).
25. The Zyprexa litigation was not the first case in which Judge Weinstein used the term quasiclass action, nor the last. See supra note 11. However, the Zyprexa litigation is significant in that it
spawned no fewer than thirty-two separate orders in which Judge Weinstein repeated that he conducted
the Zyprexa litigation as a quasi-class action.
26. This article addresses only the individual Zyprexa lawsuits that were collected and
transferred pursuant to the MDL statute in March 2004. See Complaint, Benjamin v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
No. 04-CV-893 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). This article does not address the parallel third-party-payor litigation,
or the actions pursued and settlements achieved by the federal government.
27. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Practice: A Recent Blow for Third-Party-Payor Plaintiffs: 2d
Circuit Reversed Class Certification in Zyprexa Case, Disapproving of Plaintiffs’ Classwide Reliance
Theories, 33 NAT‘L L.J. 32 (Oct. 18, 2010) (discussing UFCW Local 1776 and Participating Emp‘rs
Health and Welfare Fund v. Eli Lilly and Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2010)); see also
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting Judge Weinstein class
certification of tobacco third-party-plaintiff class action based on reliance problems) abrogated by
UFCW Local 1776, 620 F.3d 121; In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005) (reversing Judge
Weinstein class certification of third party-payor tobacco class action). In the third-party-payor
litigation, individual users of Zyprexa, and insurers and unions as third-party plaintiffs, sued Eli Lilly,
the manufacturer of Zyprexa, in a class action. Zyprexa is an antipsychotic pharmaceutical that the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration originally approved for treatment of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.
TPPs underwrite the purchase of prescription drugs for their members and insureds. The class was
composed of two subclasses of individual purchasers and TPPs that paid for Zyprexa prescriptions.
The plaintiffs alleged that Lilly had misrepresented to physicians Zyprexa's efficacy and side effects,
including weight gain, hyperglycemia and diabetes. The plaintiffs alleged that Lilly falsely claimed that
Zyprexa was more effective than other antipsychotics and promoted off-label use to treat depression,
anxiety and dementia.
These misrepresentations, the plaintiffs contended, resulted in a greater demand for Zyprexa—at a
higher price—than would have existed if accurate information about Zyprexa's efficacy and risks were
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and civil and criminal proceedings by the federal government. These
actions were brought against the pharmaceutical‘s manufacturer, Eli
Lilly.
Zyprexa is an antipsychotic pharmaceutical that the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration originally approved for treatment of schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder. The plaintiffs alleged that Eli Lilly had
misrepresented to physicians Zyprexa‘s efficacy and side effects, which
included weight gain, hyperglycemia, and diabetes. The plaintiffs
alleged that Lilly falsely claimed that Zyprexa was more effective than
other antipsychotics and promoted off-label use to treat depression,
anxiety, and dementia.
Thousands of lawsuits against Eli Lilly were filed in both federal and
state courts. In March of 2004 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation created a Zyprexa MDL in the Eastern District of New York
to be managed by Judge Jack Weinstein.28 As a consequence of the
MDL order, thousands of individual Zyprexa cases were transferred
known. Consequently, the plaintiffs alleged that class members were injured by paying for Zyprexa
prescriptions that would not have issued but for the alleged misrepresentations (the ‗quantity theory‘)
and by paying a higher price for Zyprexa than would have been charged without the alleged
misrepresentations (the ‗excessive price‘ theory).
The plaintiffs asserted five claims: a civil RICO claim based on the predicate act of mail fraud,
conspiracy to violate RICO, violation of state consumer protection laws, common law fraud and unjust
enrichment. The plaintiffs posited two damage theories: first, a quantity effect theory, claiming that the
improper promotion of off-label use resulted in more off-label prescriptions than otherwise would have
been written, and, second, a loss-of-value or excess-price theory, claiming the monetary difference
between what the plaintiffs were led to believe was Zyprexa‘s worth and Zyprexa‘s actual worth. The
plaintiffs estimated the value of their overpayments at between $4 billion and $7.7 billion.
On Sept. 5, 2008, Weinstein certified a TPPs‘ RICO class predicated on the overpricing theory but
declined to certify an individual payor class or one based on state consumer-protection laws. The court
found that the class could use generalized proof to show that Zyprexa was overpriced as a result of
Lilly‘s excessive claims of utility as well as its disavowal of secondary effects. Weinstein held that the
plaintiffs could prove reliance on a classwide basis because the alleged fraud was directed through
mailings on which doctors relied, causing TPP overpayments. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253
F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Weinstein denied the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment. In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated in part by UFCW Local
1776, 620 F.3d 121.
The Second Circuit reversed class certification, holding that, pursuant to recent U.S. Supreme Court
and Second Circuit precedents, plaintiffs must allege and prove third-party reliance as part of their chain
of causation in a RICO claim. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (holding
plaintiff alleging RICO mail fraud claim is not required to show first-person reliance); City of New
York v. Smokes Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 44 n.24 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting RICO plaintiff must
establish at least third-party reliance in order to prove causation; complete absence of reliance may
prevent plaintiff from establishing proximate cause).
28. See Letter from Multidistrict Litigation Panel to Clerk of the Eastern District of New York,
in In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, Docket Entry No. 1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2004).
Throughout federal coordination of federal Zyprexa cases, state courts also were managing state
Zyprexa cases. Many state Zyprexa cases were removed to federal court. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2009 WL 5062109 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009), aff’d sub nom., Gove v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 394 Fed. App‘x 817 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 316 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (communicating to state judges on cooperation between federal and state judges).
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from federal district courts throughout the United States in March
2004.29 Judge Weinstein supervised the Zyprexa MDL litigation and in
2006 the parties accomplished a non-class settlement of consumer
claims under the auspices of the Zyprexa MDL.30 Since then, Judge
Weinstein has issued numerous orders dealing with various trailing
issues in the wake of the Zyprexa settlement.
The core issue that prompted Judge Weinstein to invoke the concept
of the quasi-class action focused on an attorney fee dispute. In class
action litigation, attorney fees are subject to judicial scrutiny and
approval.31 Although there are different methodologies for determining
attorney fees in class action litigation,32 the most common method
calculates fees based on a percentage of the common-benefit fund that
the attorneys negotiate on behalf of the class claimants. 33
The Zyprexa litigation, however, was not resolved as a class action
settlement and therefore theoretically was not subject to any class action
constraints, such as judicial review of the attorney fee requests.
Consequently, some plaintiffs‘ attorneys sought to enforce privately
negotiated contingent fee contracts, which would have provided attorney
fees in excess of those typically awarded in common-benefit class
litigation.
Judge Weinstein apparently believed these privately negotiated fee
contracts would reward excessive fees to the attorneys, and were unfair
to claimants. In order to block enforcement of the contingent fee
contracts, Judge Weinstein requested that the special masters assisting
him in the Zyprexa litigation to adjust the requested attorney fee
schedules.34 In issuing this order, Judge Weinstein declared that the

29. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 316.
30. After an initial round of claims settlement, Judge Weinstein appointed a second plaintiffs‘
steering committee to deal with additional Zyprexa cases transferred to the MDL court after the initial
settlement. For a brief history of the settlement and post-settlement proceedings, see In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring to the Zyprexa litigation‘s quasiclass action status; denying certain plaintiffs‘ request for remand of cases from the MDL court to their
original transferor courts).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h).
32. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 14 (4th ed. 2004).
33. Id. The other common method for determining attorney fees in class litigation is the lodestar
method, which requires plaintiffs‘ attorneys to keep detailed billing records of time expended in the
representation, as well as detailed records of other fees and expenses. The court then adjusts actual
billing fees by a lodestar, which effectively is a multiplier to account for assumption of risk, loss
opportunity costs, and similar factors in pursuing class litigation on behalf of claimants.
34. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (containing the first of
series of Zyprexa orders invoking the concept of the quasi-class action; instructing special masters to
―consider a fee that shall be the lesser of the maximum reasonable general fee schedule they
recommend, the fee agreed upon between the client and the attorney in an individual case, and the
maximum amount permitted under the applicable local state rules or statutes.‖); see also In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2008 WL 2511791 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) (describing fee
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Zyprexa litigation had been administered as a quasi-class action, which
theoretically provided Judge Weinstein with the authority to adjust
attorney fees.35
Judge Weinstein‘s brief allusion to the quasi-class action in the
context of the attorney fee dispute—and the authority for this
construct—is discussed below. However, even though the quasi-class
action had its origins in the Zyprexa attorney fee dispute, it is important
to note that the concept has gained traction in no small part because of
Judge Weinstein‘s repeated citation to the label in numerous subsequent
published opinions and orders. It is almost as if repeated incantation of
a phrase can bring an avatar into actuality.
Thus, in the aftermath of Judge Weinstein‘s original announcement
that the Zyprexa litigation was administered as a quasi-class action,
Judge Weinstein issued no fewer than thirty-one additional orders reasserting that the Zyprexa litigation was a quasi-class action. However,
few of these opinions discuss what a quasi-class action is, the
consequences of characterizing a litigation as a quasi-class action, or
authority in support of this concept. Instead, Judge Weinstein‘s
voluminous orders dramatically illustrate the problem of computergenerated boilerplate opinions that repeat formulaic, conclusory set
pieces. Hence, in at least twenty-five of his thirty-one Zyprexa
decisions, Judge Weinstein pasted-and-glued the identical paragraph
referring to the quasi-class action:
The individual Zyprexa user litigation has been administered as a quasiclass action. See in re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256,
262 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (―The court, magistrate judge and special masters
will continue to administer this litigation as a quasi-class action.‖); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(―Recognizing its obligation to exercise careful oversight of this national
‗quasi class action,‘ the court has already realized its equitable power to
limit attorneys‘ fees and costs.‖) (citation omitted); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Lib. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that
individual Zyprexa user litigation ―may be characterized properly as a
quasi-class action subject to the general equitable power of the court‖); In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(same); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (same).36

Clearly, this repeated reference to the quasi-class action is selfreferential and provides no doctrinal support for the concept.
adjustments).
35. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122.
36. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2009 WL 5062109 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
2009) (considering Arizona‘s two-year statute of limitations on consumer products liability claim).
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Moreover—and significantly in the numerous orders in which Judge
Weinstein recites that Zyprexa was administered as a quasi-class action,
that status had absolutely no implication at all for the issue adjudicated
in the order.37 Despite Judge Weinstein‘s repeated reminder that the
Zyprexa litigation was administered as a quasi-class action, this status
had absolutely no effect on Judge Weinstein‘s ruling on an array of
motions dealing with statute of limitations issues, 38 summary
judgment,39 remand,40 proximate causation,41 the learned intermediary
37. See id.; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting
boilerplate of quasi-class action status; magistrate‘s discovery order in state attorney generals‘ litigation
not clearly erroneous; MDL settlement warranted); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596,
2009 WL 1173069, at app. A (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status;
order expanding authority of special master to include attorney generals of Idaho and Minnesota); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 253 F.R.D. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action
status; granting class certification to institutions and patients against pharmaceuticals manufacturer
alleging overpayment on purchases of Zyprexa), rev’d, UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d
121 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1596, 2008 WL 2696916 (E.D.N.Y.
July 2, 2008) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; order in preparation for conference on
motion for class action status in third-party payor litigation); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring to quasi-class action status as basis for limiting attorney
fees; ordering that state Medicaid agencies pay share of attorney fees and costs in procuring settlement).
38. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-2592, 2009 WL 5062109
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2009) (considering Arizona‘s two-year statute of limitations on consumer products
liability claim); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2009 WL 5062114 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
10, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; order relating to claimant‘s time-bar under
California statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596 (JBW), 2009 WL
3597447 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; action barred by California‘s
two-year statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596 (JBW), 2009 WL
2485829 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; claimant‘s action
barred by California statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2009
WL 1850970 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; plaintiff barred
by two-year statute of limitations); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 MD 1596, 2009 WL
1851062 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; plaintiff‘s claim
barred by Missouri‘s five-year statute of limitations).
39. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 688 F. Supp. 2d 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate
of quasi-class action status; manufacturer defendant‘s motions to exclude proposed expert witness
testimony and motion for summary judgment denied); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD1596, 2009 WL 2245068 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status;
issue of material fact existed as to failure to warn; summary judgment denied); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status;
defendant‘s motion for summary judgment and to exclude expert testimony denied).
40. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04 1596, 2008 WL 2511791 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008)
(referencing quasi-class action status of litigation; denying motion to remand MDL cases to their
original transferor courts); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (referring
to quasi-class action nature of Zyprexa litigation; motion to remand two thousand pending cases to state
court).
41. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 18 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate of
quasi-class action status; applying Arizona law, manufacturer‘s warning not proximate cause of
plaintiff‘s injuries); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596, 06-CV-2798, 2009 WL
2487305 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; administratrix failed
to prove inadequate warning proximately caused decedent‘s diabetes); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 07-CV-4505 (JBW), 2009 WL 2004540 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2009) (reciting
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defense,42 failure to warn,43 or other evidentiary issues.44 In short, Judge
Weinstein‘s numerous references to the quasi-class action in his
numerous Zyprexa opinions offer scant enlightenment on the quasi-class
action construct, and had no effect on his rulings (except in the attorney
fee context).
C. Dubious Authority for a Dubious Doctrine
Only a very small subset of Judge Weinstein‘s Zyprexa orders attempt
to amplify a theory of the quasi-class action, as it relates to the attorney
fee issue.45 In this handful of decisions, Judge Weinstein referred to the
Zyprexa litigation variously as a ―non-class conglomerate settlement,‖46
something analogous to the class action,47 and a ―structural class
action.‖48 Yet Judge Weinstein acknowledged that the resolution of the
boilerplateof quasi-class action status; failure to warn did not proximately cause claimant‘s injuries); In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2782 (JBW), 2009 WL 1851999
(E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; no proximate causation); In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 07-CV-987 (JBW), 2009 WL 1514628
(E.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; no basis in West Virginia law
no proximate cause upon which plaintiff could establish a failure-to-warn claim).
42. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2782 (JBW), 2009 WL
3596982 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; consumer‘s claim
barred by learned intermediary doctrine under California law); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos.
04-MD-1596 (JBW), 04-CV-1612 (JBW), 2009 WL 3596526 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (reciting
boilerplate of quasi-class action status; consumer‘s claim barred by learned intermediary doctrine); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2592 (JBW), 2009 WL 2163118
(E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; learned intermediary defense
established).
43. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 07-CV-1161 (JBW), 2009 WL
3597194 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; patient‘s estate
failed to adduce evidence of failure to warn; manufacturer not liable for failure to warn); In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-1338 (JBW), 2009 WL 1404978 (E.D.N.Y. May
19, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; drug manufacturer‘s failure to warn not cause
of plaintiff‘s injuries).
44. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reciting boilerplate
of quasi-class action status; order denying Mississippi state‘s request to utilize aggregate proof of
claims); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-2782 (JBW), 2009 WL
1852001 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; insufficient
evidence to indicate drug caused plaintiff‘s injuries; drug manufacturer not liable); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-1596 (JBW), 06-CV-1600 (JBW), 2009 WL 1514427 (E.D.N.Y. May 29,
2009) (reciting boilerplate of quasi-class action status; lack of evidence to establish causal connection
between drug and plaintiff‘s diabetes).
45. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539; In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467
F. Supp. 2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y.
2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397.
46. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d at 262; see also id. at 269 (referring to the
Zyprexa settlement as a ―conglomerate mass quasi-class action in the offing . . . .‖).
47. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
48. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (characterizing individual lawsuit
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Zyprexa litigation was ―in the nature of a private agreement between
individual plaintiffs and defendants.‖49
Judge Weinstein, in one of his earliest Zyprexa decisions, described
the central features of a quasi-class action. Quasi-class actions, then,
occur under the umbrella of MDL proceedings. Within this MDL
auspice, a quasi-class action is characterized in the following way:
The large number of plaintiffs subject to the same settlement matrix
approved by the court, the utilization of special masters approved by the
court to control discovery and assist in and administer the settlement, and
the order of the court for a huge escrow arrangement and other
interventions by the court reflect a degree of control requiring the
exercise by the court of fiduciary standards to ensure the fair treatment to
all parties and counsel regarding fees.50

In a half-dozen orders, Judge Weinstein cited various authoritative
sources in support of his ability to supervise the award of attorney fees
in the context of a private-party settlement, based on his theory that he is
supervising a quasi-class action. Judge Weinstein briefly cites four
types of authority: (1) the ―general equitable powers of the court,‖51 (2)
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (3) precedential cases, and (4) the
Class Action Fairness Act. As will be discussed, none of these briefly
referenced authorities in Judge Weinstein‘s various Zyprexa orders
remotely authorized or legitimized the concept of the quasi-class action.
In addition, Judge Weinstein also appealed to various broad policy
rationales to justify his endorsement of the quasi-class action
mechanism.
Judge Weinstein‘s broadest invocation of authority for the quasi-class
action is the ―general equitable powers of the court.‖52 Under the rubric
of the ―general equitable powers of the court,‖ Judge Weinstein located
a mandate to federal judges to creatively innovate in the supervision and
administration of aggregate litigation.
Relying on no-less an
authoritative body than the Federal Judicial Center, in a daisy-chain of
logic, Judge Weinstein suggests:
Recognizing the special difficulties presented by mass tort quasi-class
actions, the federal Judicial Center has advised that ―[a]lthough the ‗just
by the State of Mississippi as constituting a ―structural class action,‖ even though not pursued formally
under Rule 23; ―Mississippi‘s suit is in the nature of a structural class action. The extensive case law
regarding the uses and limitations of aggregative evidence in Rule 23 class action is applicable.‖).
49. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122.
50. Id. at 122–23; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. at 540 (same); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (same).
51. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. at 122; see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting quasi class action subject to general equitable
powers of the court).
52. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 271.
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speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action‘ requirement
applies to all cases, the difficult and sometimes contradictory demands
posed by mass torts make case management both challenging and critical.
The absence of precedent or of legislative rulemaking solutions should
not foreclose innovation and creativity. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, FOURTH § 22.1 (emphasis added).53

Relying, then, on the FJC‘s Manual for Complex Litigation to supply
content to the court‘s inherent power, Judge Weinstein concluded that
when confronting the novel challenges of aggregate litigation, individual
courts and judges are obligated to rely on the innovation and creativity
However, Judge
allowed by their inherent equitable power.54
Weinstein‘s references to the Manual for Complex Litigation as directly
or indirectly supporting the quasi-class action seem dubious, at best; the
Manual does not articulate, propose, endorse, or recognize the quasiclass action, anywhere in its hundreds of pages. Indeed, it might come as
a surprise to many federal judges that the FJC and its Manual for
Complex Litigation endorse the quasi-class action.
Judge Weinstein‘s second cluster of support for the quasi-class action
is derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ironically, many
of the authorities Judge Weinstein cited rely on the class action rule
itself: Rule 23(g), (h), and (e).55 Obviously, this is self-referential,
tautological, and circular reasoning: Judge Weinstein would find support
for the quasi-class action in the class action Rule 23 itself. But Rule 23
and the Advisory Committee Note nowhere speak of the concept of a
quasi-class action, and Rule 23 does not by its terms provide support for
broad assertions of judicial power in aggregate settlements outside the
context of a certified class action. Again, something either is a class
action under Rule 23, or it is not; a conglomeration is not a class action
or even something analogous to a class action, except perhaps, for size.
In addition to citing Rule 23 as authority in support of the quasi-class
action, Judge Weinstein also cites Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which mandates that federal courts should administer the
rules to accomplish the ―just determination of every action.‖ 56 This is
53. Id.
54. Id. Judge Weinstein also cites to the American Law Institute, Complex Litigation Project:
Appendix B, Reporter’s Study: A Model System for State to State Transfer and Consolidation, § 6, cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 4, October 23, 1992). While interesting as legislative history, citation to an ALI
Tentative Draft has scant authoritative value.
55. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Judge Weinstein
cites Rule 23(g)(1)(C)(iii) (explaining judicial authority in appointing counsel to consider alternative
possible fee proposals by competing applicants for appointment as class counsel); Rule 23(h)
(explaining judicial authority to approve fee petitions in class actions); and Rule 23(e)(1)–(2) (dealing
with judicial approval of proposed class action settlements); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing Rule 23 provisions in support of quasi-class action).
56. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
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bootstrap authority; it is simply not plausible that Rule 1 broadly
legitimizes private mass dispute resolution mechanisms under some
pseudo-aura of judicial sanction such as the quasi-class action.
Certainly the global asbestos class settlements in Amchem and Ortiz—
both accomplished under the formal requirements of Rule 23 and
subsequently repudiated by the Supreme Court—were not therefore
legitimized by Rule 1 simply because the settlements accomplished an
efficient resolution of all asbestos claims. Rule 1 embraces three core
values: justice, expedition, and efficiency. However, Rule 1 does not
embrace efficiency and expedition to the exclusion of justice.
The third type of authority that Judge Weinstein broadly cited
included two class actions that he presided over as district judge: the
New York asbestos litigation57 and the Agent Orange settlement.58 Yet
both these cases are dubious support—actually provide no support at
all—for the theory that a quasi-class action is a legitimate construct.
Both cases were pursued under the formal class action rule, and the New
York asbestos litigation ultimately was resolved under bankruptcy
auspices. All that these two cases represent is the proposition that
judges in properly certified class actions may approve or disapprove
attorney fee requests. Neither decision has anything to do with the
quasi-class action.
Finally, Judge Weinstein cites the Class Action Fairness Act of
200559 as providing additional support for the quasi-class action.60 He
referred to a subsection in the newly created CAFA original jurisdiction
provisions that authorize the removal of ―mass‖ actions to federal
court.61 However, this CAFA provision has nothing to do with quasiclass actions. Of the fifty states, two do not have state class action
rules.62 Consequently, actions instituted in those states that join large
numbers of plaintiffs would not be subject to removal under CAFA. To
remedy this problem, Congress enacted a provision to provide
defendants sued in these states to remove cases involving the mass
57. Id. (citing In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 784
(E.D.N.Y. 1991)).
58. Id. (citing In re Agent Orange Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1304–05 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
59. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006) (concerning original diversity jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006)
(concerning removal jurisdiction).
60. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
61. Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A)).
62. These states are Mississippi and Virginia. Mississippi, at least, permits simple joinder of
large numbers of plaintiffs in a single action, but does not recognize the class action mechanism. Cf. In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (characterizing Mississippi‘s
individual lawsuit in the Zyprexa litigation, seeking approval for use of classwide statistical aggregate
evidence, as constituting a ―structural‖ class action congruent with other forms of aggregate litigation,
insofar as the State sought to use generalized evidence to prove its claims).
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joinder of claimants, and called these types of cases mass actions. In so
doing, Congress did not contemplate, create, or endorse the concept of a
quasi-class action.
In addition to the weak rule-based and precedential authority that
Judge Weinstein conjured for his assertion of judicial power outside the
confines of an appropriately constituted class action, he relied on dicta
and policy rationales in support of his notion of the quasi-class action.
For example, Judge Weinstein cited—with disapproval—the history of
mass tort litigation as a narrative of judicial ineffectiveness in resolving
mass torts.63 Thus, after citing Rule 23 as authority for his power to
adjust attorney fees, Judge Weinstein next attacks Rule 23 jurisprudence
as an obstacle to accomplishing resolution of mass litigation. Judge
Weinstein would have it both ways: he cited to Rule 23 both in support
of his judicial powers,64 as well as an impediment to those powers.
In particular, Judge Weinstein criticized the Supreme Court‘s
decisions in Amchem65 and Ortiz,66 and the Second Circuit‘s decisions in
Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co.,67 as decisions that ―made total closure
of possible future claims by class action more difficult.‖ 68 Considering
these obstructionist Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions, Judge
Weinstein discerns a trend and support for his new quasi-class action
concept:
As a result of the dubious benefits available from class actions in
resolving mass disputes, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, more
defendants have now begun to embrace a form of quasi-class action to
aggregate and settle cases, using masters, matrices and other
administrative techniques.69

In a subsequent Zyprexa order—invoking this same theme which
criticizes the Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions—Judge
63. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (―It is well to
reflect for a moment on the recent history of mass litigation generally.‖); see also In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (manifesting concern for the fate of the
pharmaceutical industry and public health considerations).
64. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (characterizing individual
lawsuit by the State of Mississippi as constituting a ―structural class action,‖ even though not pursued
formally under Rule 23; ―Mississippi‘s suit is in the nature of a structural class action. The extensive
case law regarding the uses and limitations of aggregative evidence in Rule 23 class action is
applicable.‖). Thus, when Judge Weinstein desires to use Rule 23 or Rule 23 jurisprudence, he finds
authority to do so by conjuring the litigation before him as some pseudo-class action.
65. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
66. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
67. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part vacated in part,
Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
68. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing, for discussion purposes
only, also to the PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2006)).
69. Id. at 269–70.
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Weinstein similarly suggests the following:
This development [the Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions] has led
a number of judges and attorneys, particularly in pharmaceutical cases, to
attempt mass settlements on consolidated and cooperative basis without
the formalities of a class action. The substitute quasi-class action
aggregate technique has advantages and is being closely studied.70

Judge Weinstein‘s observation concerning the practicing bar‘s and the
judiciary‘s embrace of private settlements as a preferred means for
resolving aggregate liabilities, however, certainly does not provide
authoritative legal support for the quasi-class action. (Or, just because
some people may be doing it, doesn‘t make it legitimate.) In addition,
apart from Judge Weinstein, there is scant record that ―a number‖ of
judges have supervised private mass settlement deals outside the
purview of the class action rule.71
It is hardly surprising that Judge Weinstein would eschew the Second
Circuit‘s Stephenson decision which in essence held that Judge
Weinstein had failed to provide future claimants with adequate
representation at the time of his approval of the Agent Orange
settlement.72 But Judge Weinstein‘s repudiation of the Amchem, Ortiz,
and Stephenson decisions manifests a tone-deaf dismissal of the
fundamental importance of those cases. Judge Weinstein rejected the
Court‘s Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson decisions because he perceived
those decisions as limiting the usefulness of the class action rule to
resolve mass litigation; collectively, these decisions—Judge Weinstein
believed—bound his hands as a judge and frustrated his ability to
achieve efficiency in resolving big cases. These decisions were illconceived, in his view, because they were impediments to judicial
efforts to resolve mass cases. In addition, these decisions were harmful
to industry, and in the instance of pharmaceutical litigation, adverse to
public health considerations.73
70. In re Zyprex Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. 539, 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing, for discussion
purposes only, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Preliminary Draft No. 4,2006)).
71. See discussion of the Vioxx settlement, infra Part II.D; see also In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05 1708 (DWF/AJB), 2008 WL 682174, at *6 (D.
Minn. Mar. 7, 2008) (discussing court authority to supervise attorney fee award in private settlement of
medical device mass action: ―Before this Court is a coordinated litigation of many individual yet related
cases that effectively is, and proceeded as, a quasi-class action.‖). Apart from the Zyprexa, Guidant, and
Vioxx litigations, as of this writing the author could not find any other reported decision referring to a
mass settlement resolved as a quasi-class action.
72. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part vacated in part,
Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (4–4 decision) (noting future claimants not
bound by class settlement of future claims due to lack of adequate representation at the time of the
settlement; future claimants permitted to pursue collateral attack against the settlement).
73. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (―In addition,
the viability of an effective pharmaceutical industry and public health considerations necessitate
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In this same vein, Judge Weinstein drew further support for private
settlements under the umbrella of the quasi-class action because he
viewed the quasi-class action as an antidote to the perceived failure of
past mass tort litigation: ―Most would agree that a reprise of the asbestos
litigation with an almost uncontrolled search by plaintiffs‘ attorneys for
new cases and new parties, ultimately exhausting the courts and
bankrupting industries, ought not be encouraged.‖74
However, the fundamental purpose of the Courts‘ reasoning in
Amchem, Ortiz, and Stephenson was to strengthen the due process
protections of absent class members by requiring heightened scrutiny of
the Rule 23 adequacy-of-representation requirement, especially in the
settlement context.
Judge Weinstein, then, would jettison the
requirements of Rule 23 and the due process protections of absent class
members, in favor of efficiency rationales. Therefore, if Amchem, Ortiz,
and Stephenson set the due process bar too high, Judge Weinstein
approved circumventing these pesky decisions by allowing litigants to
privately cut deals without the necessity to satisfy formal Rule 23
requirements and its due process protections. If Rule 23 is now a barrier
to accomplishing aggregate settlements, Judge Weinstein would simply
dispense with the rule, except when he needs the rule as buttressing
support for his ability to exercise some judicial authority in a limited
sphere of operation.75
efficient and fair control by the courts of cases of this kind.‖).
74. In re Zyprex Prods. Liab. Litig., 238 F.R.D. at 541.
75. See, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(characterizing individual lawsuit by the State of Mississippi as constituting a ―structural class action,‖
even though not pursued formally under Rule 23; ―Mississippi‘s suit is in the nature of a structural class
action. The extensive case law regarding the uses and limitations of aggregative evidence in Rule 23
class action is applicable.‖).
In fairness to Judge Weinstein, he does at least concede, in one of his Zyprexa orders, that
―Avoiding formal Rule 23 class actions presents serious pitfalls.‖ See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.,
238 F.R.D. at 541. Judge Weinstein notes:
One is the possibility that new cases, and attorneys, will be attracted to the honey pot of
litigation after all, or almost all, of the well-founded cases have been disposed of. Only the Rule
23 class action can provide full closure in many litigations. Id.
However, after acknowledging that Rule 23 has its virtues, Judge Weinstein nonetheless defaults to
his preferred position, which favors private settlement of mass litigation under the auspices of MDL
proceedings.
Again, in one of his earliest decisions discussing the quasi-class action, Judge Weinstein
acknowledges that many of the concerns about the protection of class members should apply with equal
force to aggregate settlements achieved in a non-class format. Thus, Judge Weinstein writes:
Many of the same considerations that necessitate close judicial supervision of plaintiffs‘ counsel
and proposed settlements in the class action context―such as protecting absent class or
disinterested litigants, and dealing with plaintiffs‘ practical inability to monitor their attorneys,
some of whom represent hundreds of clients within the same litigation―apply to quasi-class
actions such as the instant one. Some of the conventions required when a class is certified are
appropriate in quasi-class actions involving large aggregations of claims. In both contexts, the
primary goal of the court is to ―ensure that similarly situated individuals receive equal fairness
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D. The Vioxx Litigation: Exploitation and Expansion of the Quasi-Class
Action
The resolution of the Vioxx litigation illustrates how judicial
deployment of the quasi-class action concept has been expanded beyond
judicial authority to adjust attorney fees to adversely affect the rights of
unrepresented or under-represented persons with an interest in the
litigation. As will be discussed below, the Vioxx litigation has inspired
the first wholesale attack against the concept of the quasi-class action,
with an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.76
Merck Co. manufactured, marketed, and distributed Vioxx, a drug
designed to relieve pain from osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis,
menstrual pain, and migraine headaches.77 The Food and Drug
Administration approved Vioxx for sale in the United States on May 20,
1999. Merck withdrew Vioxx from the market in September 2004, after
the results of a clinical trial indicated that use of Vioxx increased the
risks of cardiovascular thrombotic events such as myocardial infarction
(heart attack) and ischemic stroke. Between 1999 and 2004, it was
estimated that physicians wrote nearly 105 million prescriptions for
Vioxx, and that an estimated twenty million patients had taken the
drug.78
Thousands of individual and class action suits against Merck were
filed in state and federal courts alleging products liability, tort, fraud,
and breach of warranty claims. On February 16, 2005, the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation created a Vioxx MDL and transferred
all federal cases to the Eastern District of Louisiana.79 Between
February 2005 and 2006, the court engaged in MDL coordinated pretrial proceedings, including the appointment of plaintiff and defendant
steering committees. In November 2006, the presiding Judge Eldon
protections regardless of how the courts aggregated the litigation.‖ L. Elizabeth Chamblee,
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Tort claims Creates Second-Class
Settlements, 65 La. L. Rev. 157, 241 (2004). In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d
at 272.
However, Judge Weinstein‘s initial recognition of the need for Rule 23 constraints in the context of
quasi-class action settlements does not re-appear in his numerous subsequent citations to the quasi-class
action.
76. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010 U.S. Briefs 666
(Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 10-666); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Glenn L. Dier v. Merck Sharp & Dohme
Corp., 2010 U.S. Briefs 666 (Jan. 21, 2011) (No. 10-666). The Court denied the petition for certiorari on
February 22, 2011. See Dier v. Merck & Co. Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
77. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. La. 2009) (addressing motion
for reconsideration of attorney fee cap on contingent fee arrangements).
78. Id. at 551. A more detailed factual background to the Vioxx litigation, before creation of the
Vioxx MDL, is at In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 656 (E.D. La. 2005) (resolving
Daubert challenges to various expert witnesses).
79. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005) (creating Vioxx MDL).
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Fallon denied class certification of a nationwide class because the
plaintiffs‘ claims raised choice-of-law problems and numerous
individualized questions of fact.80 After denial of class certification,
however, the court conducted six bellwether trials.81 As a consequence
of the bellwether trials, the parties entered in settlement negotiations and
on November 9, 2007, Merck announced a settlement of the Vioxx
claims.82
The Vioxx settlement was a private settlement agreement. It
established a pre-funded program in the amount of $4.85 billion dollars
for resolving pending or tolled federal and state claims against Merck as
of the date of the settlement. The settlement provided compensation for
claims of heart attack, ischemic stroke, and sudden cardiac death. The
settlement agreement provided for claimants to opt-in to the fund.
The opt-in mechanism set forth threshold criteria for eligibility to optin to the settlement. In addition, the settlement imposed a requirement
that any plaintiffs‘ counsel enrolling clients in the Master Settlement
Agreement had to affirm that the attorney had recommended to 100% of
the attorney‘s clients that they must accept the terms of the agreement,
or the attorney must attempt to withdraw from representing clients who
refused to accept the settlement terms.83
The settlement agreement also gave the court continuing authority to
oversee various aspects concerning implementation of the settlement,
including the appointment of a fee allocation committee, allocating a
percentage of the settlement proceeds to a common benefit fund, and
modifying any provisions of the settlement agreement that were
otherwise unenforceable.84 The MDL court also asserted its ―inherent
authority over the multidistrict litigation‖ to ensure that ―the settlement
proceedings move[d] forward in a uniform and efficient manner.‖85
Merck retained the right to walk away from the settlement if certain
conditions were not satisfied.86 In July of 2008, Merck announced that
80. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 458–59, 461 (E.D. La. 2006).
81. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 552. During this same period, thirteen
additional cases were tried in state courts in Texas, New Jersey, California, Alabama, Illinois, and
Florida. Id.
82. See Settlement Agreement, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 1657 (E.D. La. Nov. 9,
2007), available at http://www.browngreer.com/vioxxsettlement.
83. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-30446, 388 Fed. App‘x 391, 393 (5th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom., Dier v. Merck & Co., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
84. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 552–53; see also In re Vioxx Prods.
Liab. Litig., No. 08-1633, 2008 WL 3285912 (E.D. La. Aug. 7, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Avmed Inc. v.
BrownGreer PLC., 300 Fed. App‘x 261 (5th Cir. 2008).
85. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 553; see also Pretrial Order No. 32, In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig. (2007) (No. 04-MD-1657) (memorializing the court‘s inherent authority over
the multidistrict litigation to appoint a fee allocation committee).
86. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
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it was satisfied that the thresholds necessary to trigger funding of the
Vioxx program had been fulfilled, that Merck would waive its walkaway privilege, and that it would begin funding the program.87 On
August 20, 2008, the claims administrator reported to the court that it
had successfully reviewed claims from approximately 2,750 claims for
interim payments. At this point, the court issued an order capping
plaintiffs‘ contingent fee arrangements at 32%.88
Similar to events in the Zyprexa litigation, the Vioxx MDL Court‘s
decision to cap the contingent fee arrangements caused a consortium of
plaintiffs‘ lawyers—the Vioxx Litigation Consortium (VCL)—to
challenge that decision.89 The VCL challenged the court‘s authority to
adjust legal fees by arguing that classifying an MDL as a quasi-class
action was inappropriate.90 The VCL pointed out that the underlying
actions in an MDL remain individual in nature, while a class action is a
representative proceeding.91 For this reason, the VCL contended, fee
capping was appropriate in a class action but not in an MDL
proceeding.92
The court responded by indicating that it was true that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provided that district courts may
require reasonable fees in class actions, while the MDL statute lacked an
analogous provision.93 But, relying on both the Zyprexa and Guidant
cases, the Louisiana court held that the Vioxx settlement could ―properly
be analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the Court
equitable authority to review contingent fee contracts for
reasonableness.‖94 The court noted that the global settlement in the

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 558.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (comparing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii), and FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h), with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407).
94. Id. at 553–54, 558–59. Taking a page from Judge Weinstein‘s playbook, the Louisiana
federal court located its authority to oversee attorney fee arrangements in the quasi-class action, in
various provisions of Rule 23 as well as the FJC‘s Manual for Complex Litigation. Thus, the Court
opined:
First, any court presiding over a mass tort proceeding possesses equitable authority to examine
fee arrangements. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly grant this power to district
courts in class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(C)(iii); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.927 (2004). While and MDL is distinct
from a class action, the substantial similarities between the two warrant the treatment of an MDL
as a quasi-class action. Order & Reasons, August 27, 2008, Rec. Doc. 15722, 8–9 (Aug. 27,
2008). Accordingly, this Court found that ―the Vioxx global settlement may be properly
analyzed as occurring in a quasi-class action, giving the Court equitable authority to review
contingent fee contracts for reasonableness.‖ Id. at 9; see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable
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Vioxx litigation bore a significant resemblance to the Zyprexa global
settlement.95 Comparing the two litigations, the court concluded that
―[g]iven these similarities, and § 1407‘s mandate of just and efficient
treatment, it is correct to consider the MDL as a quasi-class action.‖96
Furthermore, in assessing the boundaries of its authority under the
private settlement agreement, the court further noted that the parties had
given the court express authority to modify any provision under certain
circumstances.97
E. The Dier Attack Against the Vioxx Quasi-Class Action
Although the VCL asserted an unsuccessful objection to the district
court‘s authority to modify fee arrangements, another group of Vioxx
plaintiffs who had not opted-in to the settlement subsequently mounted a
different challenge to the court‘s continuing authority over this quasiclass action.98 The Master Settlement Agreement designated Judge
Fallon as its chief administrator.99 In this capacity, Judge Fallon entered
several pre-trial orders in November 2007 with respect to the claims of
those plaintiffs who could not or chose not to participate in the Master
Settlement Agreement (the non-settling plaintiffs).
In particular, Judge Fallon issued pre-trial order 28 (PTO 28)100 that
required non-settling plaintiffs to notify their healthcare providers that
they must preserve evidence pertaining the plaintiffs‘ use of Vioxx. 101
In addition, these plaintiffs were also required to produce pharmacy
records and medical authorizations, answers to interrogatories, and a
Rule 26(a) report from a medical expert attesting that the plaintiff had
sustained an injury caused by Vioxx and that they injury occurred within
a specified period.102 If a non-settling plaintiff failed to comply with

Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *18 (D. Minn. March
7, 2008) (relying on the quasi-class action nature of an MDL proceeding and the court‘s
equitable authority to implement a reasonable cap on contingent fees); In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (exercising the court‘s inherent power to
―impos[e] . . . fiduciary standards to ensure fair treatment to all parties and counsel regarding
fees and expenses.‖). Id.
95. Id., 650 F. Supp. at 559.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 554.
98. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-30446, 388 Fed. App‘x 391, 2010 WL 2802352 (5th
Cir. July 16, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Dier v. Merck & Co., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
99. Id. at 393.
100. Id. PTO 28 is characterized as a ―Lone Pine‖ order. See id.; 388 Fed. App‘x at 393 n.1.
(describing Lone Pine orders).
101. Id. at 393–94. The court issued several other pre-trial orders; see description of PTOs 30 and
31.
102. Id. at 394.
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these requirements, the court could dismiss the plaintiffs‘ claims with
prejudice.103
Various non-settling Vioxx plaintiffs brought challenges to PTO 28,
which Judge Fallon dismissed.104 In November 2008, Merck moved for
a show-cause order relating to sixty-one non-settling plaintiffs for their
failure to provide a case-specific expert report required by PTO 28, and
in December 2008 Judge Fallon issued this show cause order. In April
2009, Judge Fallon dismissed certain plaintiffs‘ complaints (the Dier
plaintiffs) with prejudice for failure to comply with PTO 28.105
The Dier plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their cases to the Fifth
Circuit, challenging the validity of the Master Settlement Agreement,
Judge Fallon‘s lack of impartiality, and PTO 28.106 In a brief,
unpublished decision issued July 16, 2010, the Fifth Circuit held that the
Dier plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Master Settlement
Agreement, and denied all the other challenges to the dismissal of their
cases.107
In November 2010, the Dier plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court
for a writ of certorari to review the Fifth Circuit‘s decision. In this
appeal, the Dier plaintiffs perfected an attack against the authority of the
district court to enter PTOs against the non-settling plaintiffs under the
umbrella of a quasi-class action. The concept of the quasi-class action
was attacked not for the court‘s authority to adjust attorney fees, but the
judiciary‘s expansive, continuing authority over a settlement to modify
the rights of claimants. The Dier plaintiffs squarely focused on the
court‘s authority derived from the concept of a quasi-class action,
framing the issue as follows:
Can a transferee court use its authority pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to
invoke the judicially-created ―quasi-class action‖ doctrine to preside over
a mass settlement involving thousands of widely divergent personal
injury claims and permit such a settlement to be approved outside the
strictures of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without
contravening Article III and depriving individual litigants of their rights
guaranteed by the due process and right to trial by jury clauses of the
Constitution of the United States.108

103. Id.
104. Id. The non-settling Vioxx plaintiffs also brought challenges to subsequent orders by Judge
Fallon ordering the non-settling plaintiffs to appear in person at various conferences held around the
country. For a description of these orders, see id. at 395. Judge Fallon similarly denied challenges to
these orders.
105. Id. Dier maintained that they were in substantial compliance with PTO 28 and that New
York law required only general causation proof.
106. Id. at 395–97.
107. Id. at 395, 397–98.
108. See Petition for Writ of Ceriorari, In re: Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 2010 U.S. Briefs 666
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Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in February 2011,109
the Dier plaintiffs‘ challenge to the quasi-class action sets forth the
constitutional, statutory, rule-based, and precedential grounds for
repudiating this construct. As such, the Dier petition comprehensively
set forth the array of arguments against the legitimacy of judicial
authority invoked under the umbrella of a quasi-class action.
Thus, the judicially created quasi-class action contravenes Article III
of the Constitution, deprives litigants of their due process and jury trial
rights, violates the Rules Enabling Act,110 impermissibly expands the
scope of judicial authority under the multidistrict litigation statute, and
does an end-run around the requirements of the class action Rule 23.
Moreover, private settlement agreements consummated as quasi-class
actions may, if unchecked, violate the spirit if not the letter of the
court‘s Amchem and Ortiz decisions.
The nub of the Dier plaintiffs‘ argument was that courts now
illegitimately employ the multidistrict litigation procedure to create and
approve class action settlements outside the scope of Rule 23. The Dier
plaintiffs objected to Judge Fallon‘s view there is a judicial trend
towards recognizing the quasi-class action, and that class actions may
morph into multidistrict litigation.111 This trend, they objected, not only
impermissibly intruded upon legislative prerogatives, ―but runs
roughshod over constitutional rights of individual litigants . . . who
‗morph‘ from absent class members into ‗non-settling plaintiffs‘ by
judicial override of Rule 23.‖112
Thus, the Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement established a
nationwide administrative claims regime similar to the nationwide class
action settlements in Amchem and Ortiz, but contrary to the court‘s
opinions repudiating those settlements, ―the managerial authority
conferred upon multidistrict courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 is
being used to create class settlements outside Rule 23. . . ‖113 The Dier
plaintiffs argued that in the past decade federal judges have made an
end-run around Rule 23 ―by impermissibly expanding the limited
reservoir of authority conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1407 and sought to
provide doctrinal basis for avoiding their fiduciary duties to absent class
(Nov. 17, 2010) (No. 10-666) [hereinafter Petition].
109. See Dier v. Merck & Co. Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (2011).
110. Petition at *35–37. The Rules Enabling Act provides that rules of procedure ―shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.‖ See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). In essence, the Dier
plaintiffs contend that settlement outside the purview of Rule 23 requirements, under the umbrella of the
quasi-class action, is ―bottomed on the view that the day in court principle has gone the way of the dodo
bird.‖ Id. at *37.
111. Id. at *19–20.
112. Id. at *20.
113. Id. at *19.
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members by creating a quasi-class action.‖114
Pointing to the district court‘s denial of certification of a nationwide
Vioxx class action, the Dier plaintiffs contended that the settling parties
in Vioxx consummated a private agreement that they could not have
accomplished under the requirements of Rule 23.115 In so doing, the
settling parties were able to negotiate a deal that circumvented the
court‘s concerns about, and requirements for, global class action
settlements articulated in Amchem and Ortiz.116 For the Dier plaintiffs,
the use of the quasi-class action rationale to empower Judge Fallon to
dismiss their cases for non-compliance with the PTO 28 ―breathe[d] real
meaning into the concerns this Court observed in both Amchem and
Ortiz and especially its conclusion that settlement classes require
‗heightened attention.‘‖117 The Dier plaintiffs argued: ―The importance
of the issue raised . . . is that, absent this Court putting a halt to the trend
[of using the quasi-class action], the federal courts will be able to create
de facto class actions at will outside the strictures of Rule 23.‖118
The Dier plaintiffs objected to the negotiation and consummation of
the Vioxx deal not subject to Rule 23 requirements, precisely because in
its view Merck, as a wealthy defendant, accomplished a favorable
sweetheart deal to the detriment of absent class members. 119 In addition,
under the umbrella of the quasi-class action, Merck engineered as part of
the agreement the requirement for the subsequent discovery orders
against non-opt-in plaintiffs, with the punitive dismissal of claims for
non-compliance.120
114. Id. at *20. The Dier plaintiffs also cited Judge Alex Kozinski as having identified a similar
trend, characterizing this as ―a remarkable power grab by federal judges who have parleyed a narrow
grant of authority to conduct consolidated discovery into a mechanism for systematically denying
plaintiffs the right to a trial in the forum of their choice.‖ Id. at *26 (citing In re: Am, Cont‘l
Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig. Lexecon, Inc., 102 F.3d 1524, 1540 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski,
C.J., dissenting)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at *21.
117. Id. at *30.
118. Id. at *22–23; see also id. at *36 (citing Charles Silver and Geoffrey P. Miller, The QuasiClass Action Method of managing Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 107, 111 (2010)) (―By managing MDLs as they have, judges have compromised their
independence, created unnecessary conflicts of interest, ridden roughshod over attorneys, turned a blind
eye to questionable behavior, and weakened plaintiff lawyers‘ incentives to faithfully serve their
clients.‖).
119. Id. at *23. The Dier plaintiffs objected: ―The practical effect may be seen in the instant
litigation in that it empowers defendants, who are inevitably large-scale corporations, to use their wealth
and resources to dictate the terms of the settlement.‖
120. Id. at *24–25 (―Indeed, in Amchem this Court instructed the safeguards provided for by rule
(a) and (b) were set for the protection of absent class members and serve to ‗inhibit appraisals of the
chancellor‘s foot kind‘ at 521 U.S. 621 . . . . Since there is precious little in the record which permits
any substantive review of the settlement achieved below, the result obtained permits the inference that
the power of the purse had an influence in letting a wealthy defendant get out cheap.‖).
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Furthermore, because the Vioxx deal was negotiated and
consummated free from Rule 23 constraints, the district court was
―hampered by both lack of adversarial presentation on the one hand and
hydraulics of moving a large-scale settlement such as the one at bar.‖121
The fact that private settlements may be accomplished apart from class
action requirements affected the rights of persons not wishing to agree:
―These machinations virtually guarantee one or another legal doctrine
will be invoked to dispose of recalcitrants without reaching the merits of
their claims.‖122
Finally, the Dier plaintiffs additionally noted the thin doctrinal basis
for the concept of the quasi-class action, suggesting that Judge
Weinstein in the Zyprexa decisions did nothing more than describe the
characteristics of an MDL and then ―baldly assert they provided the
foundation for the doctrine of quasi-class action.‖123 Tracing the
evolution of Judge Weinstein‘s jurisprudential philosophy relating to the
resolution of mass tort litigation, the Dier plaintiffs pointed out that
Judge Weinstein consistently believed that due process must be
subordinated to the public interest implicated in the resolution of mass
tort litigation.124 Moreover, the Dier plaintiffs challenged Judge
Weinstein‘s suggestion that the Class Action Fairness Act provided
additional support for the judicial embrace of the concept of the quasiclass action.125
*

*

*

As indicated above, the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari to
the Dier plaintiffs‘ appeal, thus avoiding consideration of the legitimacy
of the quasi-class action question raised by these plaintiffs. Moreover,
Merck‘s response to the certiorari petition largely ignored the core issue
relating to the quasi-class action. Instead, Merck simply argued that the
Fifth Circuit correctly determined that the Dier plaintiffs lacked

121. Id. at *28.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *38.
124. Id. at *39–40.
125. Id. at *40–41 (citing Judge Young: ―It is precisely because MDL practice is perceived so
clearly to favor the defense that Congress appears to have lost confidence in a judicial management
mechanism that once had such great promise. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1092, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), itself thought to be legislation that favors business defendants, see Natale v. Pfizer,
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 161, 164–68 (D. Mass. 2005), contains an unmistakable rebuke to the Panel on
Multi-District Litigation in Section 4, which provides that no class action removed to federal court under
its provisions shall thereafter be transferred to another district pursuant to Title 28, Section 1407(a) of
the U.S. Code without the request of the majority of plaintiffs.[] See Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 1112 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i)).‖).
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standing to challenge the agreement.126 While cabining its arguments
chiefly to the standing issue, Merck nonetheless argued that the district
court acted well within its broad discretion to manage multidistrict
proceedings when it entered and enforced its pretrial orders.127
In response to the Dier plaintiffs, Merck contended that the lower
court decisions did not conflict with the Court‘s holdings in Amchem
and Ortiz, because Amchem and Ortiz involved class settlements.128 The
Vioxx Master Settlement Agreement, Merck argued, did not present the
dangers that the Court identified in Amchem and Ortiz because the MSA
was never viewed as a ―class settlement.‖129 Moreover, the MSA was
not a de facto class action settlement. Thus, the risks presented by class
settlements were not germane to the Vioxx deal because the agreement
was binding only on individuals who affirmatively opted-in to the
agreement.130
In addition, the district court had not abused its discretion in entering
the pre-trial orders—especially PTOs 28 and 29—because district courts
have wide discretion to manage discovery in proceedings before
them.131 A district court‘s discretion to manage complex multidistrict
proceedings, Merck argued, includes the power to issue so-called Lone
Pine orders,132 as well as to order dismissal of claims as a sanction for
non-compliance with a trial court‘s orders.133
In sum, Merck declined to directly address the Dier plaintiffs‘
objections to the court‘s use of the quasi-class action. Instead, Merck
contended that the Vioxx agreement was simply not a class action, and
therefore outside the purview of class action jurisprudence. By evading
the quasi-class action issue, Merck offered no further analysis,
justification, or rationales supporting the court‘s invocation of the
doctrine. Thus, while the Dier plaintiff‘s certiorari petition offers a
detailed roadmap for a future challenge to the quasi-class action,
Merck‘s opposition does not afford a similar array of supporting
arguments. Instead, Merck‘s opposition to the certiorari petition left
defense of the legitimacy of the quasi-class action to some other

126. Brief in Opposition at 1, Dier v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1477 (Jan. 21,
2011) (No. 10-666) (noting that every court that has considered the question has held that non-settling
parties, even parties who opt out of class settlements, lack standing to challenge a private agreement
between parties) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
127. Id. at 14, 23–27.
128. Id. at 15.
129. Id. (noting, ironically, that the district court expressly considered and denied class
certification in the underlying litigation).
130. Id. at 16.
131. Id. at 24.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 25.
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litigators in some other future action.
II. THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION AND THE RULE OF LAW
As indicated at the outset of this Article, there is no such thing as a
quasi-class action and the judiciary ought to reject this doctrine as an
illegitimate expansion of judicial authority and a usurpation of the rule
of law. Once individuals have retained counsel and are represented to
pursue legal redress—especially in complex, aggregate litigation—
courts undertake a fiduciary role to protect the interests of all claimants,
and not to subvert the interests of some. Therefore, courts should not
become complicit in providing an aura of judicial authority, through
invocation of the quasi-class action, to sanctify private backroom deals
negotiated and consummated to the advantage of some, but to the
detriment of others.
The concept of the quasi-class action is the very antithesis of the class
action. Instead, the concept cloaks a federal judge with an aura of
authority to do whatever the judge desires, and outside the formal
requirements of Rule 23 or class action jurisprudence. This leaves both
plaintiff and defense attorneys involved in complex cases at liberty to
privately arrange solutions to their own advantage, also free from the
constraints of the class action rule. The quasi-class action is not
authorized by Rule 23, the Class Action Fairness Act, or some
expansive interpretation of the multi-district litigation statute, as is
discussed below.
Furthermore, the quasi-class action is not legitimized by any crisis
mentality inspired by complex cases on the federal docket, or arguments
derived from judicial efficiency and economy. Numerous federal courts
agree—and it is fundamental principle of class action jurisprudence—
that the value of judicial efficiency can never be invoked to supersede
the interests of justice and fairness.
A. Rule 23 Does Not Authorize or Rationalize the Quasi-Class Action by
Analogy
The federal class action rule historically has been centrally concerned
with providing due process protections to individuals involved in
aggregate litigation. The quasi-class action is an oxymoron: the label
provides no formal or informal protections to individuals involved in
aggregate litigation. Instead, the quasi-class action supplies pseudolegitimacy for those who wish to manipulate aggregate deals outside the
rule of law, but under the guise of judicial legitimacy.
The quasi-class action offends the very understanding of the class
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action. The core concept underlying the class action rule is that it is
representative litigation; claimants in the class are not actually present in
the litigation to represent their own interests, as they would be if the
individual were involved in a simple, bipolar litigation. Thus, Rule 23
and the considerable class jurisprudence developed under the rule sets
forth numerous due process protections for absent class members.
These due process protections are derived from the fact that class action
judgments are binding on all members of a class, and that fairness
dictates that before an absent claimant may be bound to a judgment, that
individual must be adequately represented by those pursuing the
litigation.134
Perhaps the most significant difference between ordinary litigation
and class litigation is the imposition or intercession of a judicial officer,
at the very outset of the litigation, to manage and oversee the litigation.
This is not excessive formalism or hoop-jumping; the purpose is to
ensure the protection of individuals not present to represent themselves.
Rule 23 sets forth detailed requirements, many of which are directed
at ensuring the due process protections of absent class members. For
example, Rule 23(a)(4) requires that a court make a finding that
proposed class representatives are adequate to represent persons not
actually present to protect their own interests.135 The adequacy
requirement is to ensure that the class representatives are knowledgeable
about the litigation, understand the nature of the claims and defenses,
the scope of the class they are representing, and that they are free from
conflicts of interest.
Adequate class representatives are necessary from the outset of class
litigation to serve as independent fiduciaries protecting the interests of
absent class members against possible self-dealing by class counsel and
their adversaries.
Adequate class representatives serve as an
independent bulwark against potentially collusive settlement agreements
negotiated by interested parties, to the advantage of some and the
disadvantage of others. Adequate class representatives provide a
safeguard against potentially deleterious reverse auction settlements
whereby defense counsel seeks out the weakest class counsel with
whom to negotiate discounted settlements.
In tandem with the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement for adequate class
representatives, Rule 23(g) provides for judicial appointment of class
counsel.136 Judicial appointment of class counsel, at the outset of class
action litigation, is another way in which the judicial system protects the
interests of absent class members. Thus, pursuant to Rule 23(g), a court
134. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g).
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must evaluate proposed candidates to represent the class, examining
counsel‘s experience, resources, and potential conflicts of interest,
among other factors.137 In addition, if more than one attorney seeks
appointment as class counsel, a court must comparatively evaluate
among competing candidates to represent the class.138
Courts afford potential class members additional due process
protections through other requirements of Rule 23. For example, no
aggregate litigation may proceed as a class action unless the court
certifies that the proposed action satisfies all the requirements of Rule
23(a),139 and may be maintained as a class pursuant to one of the
categories of Rule 23(b).140 The early certification of a class ensures
that there is sufficient cohesion of interest among class members to
permit their claims to be resolved on an aggregate basis. 141 If a court
certifies a damage class action under Rule 23(b)(3), then class members
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to opt out, among other
rights.142
One of the most important due process protections afforded by the
class action rule is the requirement of judicial approval of any class
action settlement.143 Since 2003, Rule 23(e) now requires that judges
conduct a formal ―fairness hearing‖ prior to approving a class action
settlement. At a fairness hearing, the court must finally certify the class;
evaluate the settlement to determine if it is fair, adequate, and
reasonable; and consider fee petitions of class counsel. The court must
evaluate the settlement for both procedural and substantive fairness. In
this fashion, the court serves as the ultimate fiduciary and guardian of
the interests of absent class members.
Aggregate litigation conducted under the umbrella of multidistrict
litigation, but outside the requirements and protections of the class
action rule, affords individuals who are involved in an aggregate
litigation none of these protections. Indeed, as the Vioxx litigation
demonstrated, it is entirely possible for a court supervising a
multidistrict litigation to determine that a proposed class action is not
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1).
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(2).
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). These are the requirements that the proposed class satisfy
requisite numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).
141. See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997) (discussing sufficient cohesion
among class members to proceed as a class action).
142. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). Since 2003, the rule also permits judges, in their discretion to order
that notice be provided in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes. However, the 2003 amendment to Rule 23
does not permit class members to opt-out of these mandatory classes. Notice to absent class members
also must indicate that class members have the right to appear in the action with their own counsel, if
they choose.
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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suitable for class action treatment, but then for the attorneys to go off
and cut a deal without regard for the requirements of class action
litigation. For attorneys (on both sides of the docket) who wish to evade
the strict requirements for resolving aggregate litigation, the quasi-class
action is a wonderful construct, providing judicial cover without the
burdens, roadblocks, and entanglements of due process.
B. The Quasi-Class Action as a End-Run Solution Around the Class
Action Rule and Class Action Jurisprudence—The Evolution of the
Concept
The emergence of the quasi-class action represents the logical
convergence of two class action trends over the past three decades. This
narrative embodies the increasing frustrations of the plaintiff and
defense bar, as well as the judiciary, in resolving aggregate litigation.
Against the backdrop of increasing impediments to settling aggregate
claims, the actors involved in complex litigation have arrived at the
quasi-class action as a favorable conceit to resolve massive litigation,
favorable to all except perhaps the claimants involved in the litigation.
As will be discussed below, the ascendancy of the MDL auspices has
effectively freed the actors involved in aggregate litigation from most
legal constraints, allowing parties to go off and negotiate deals liberated
from the rule of law.
In order to comprehend how the quasi-class action has provided an
ingenious construct that enables aggregate settlements, it is important to
understand why the various actors involved in complex litigation have
welcomed this concept. In the past thirty years, federal courts have
heightened requirements for certification of litigation classes, and more
stringently articulated the rigorous analysis standard for class
certification.144 After a brief period of experimentation with innovative
multi-phase class action trial plans,145 federal courts in 1995–1996
reacted by issuing a series of landmark decisions that rejected
certification of litigation classes, especially in mass tort litigation
arena.146
144. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Products Liab. Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2009); In re
IPO Sec. Fraud Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (clarifying standards that courts must apply in
conducting a rigorous analysis in order to grant class certification).
145. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding class
certification of torture and death victims of Ferdinand Marcos regime; multi-phase trial plan including
statistical damage sampling); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (involving
three phase trial plan, trying state of the art defense and liability for punitive damages in first phase).
146. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class
certification of a nationwide class of persons addicted to tobacco products); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc.,
75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing class certification of a nationwide class of penile implant
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The series of judicial decisions in the mid-1990s that tightened class
certification requirements seriously affected the plaintiffs‘ bar‘s ability
to pursue class litigation in federal court. The plaintiffs‘ bar reacted by
regrouping and retreating—many attorneys determined to avoid federal
courts altogether, and instead to pursue class litigation in state courts.
This retreat to state courts ushered in a decade of rapidly expanding state
court class action litigation, accompanied by forum-shopping for
favorable venues and the emergence of so-called ―judicial hell-holes,‖
so labeled because of the propensity of certain state courts to provide
quick and easy class certification on the pleadings alone.
The ascendance of state court class litigation and easy class
certification there precipitated its own backlash, which eventually
resulted in efforts by the corporate defense bar to enact the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005.147 CAFA provided a mechanism for corporate
defendants to remove state class actions to federal court, where
defendants could rely on the body of restrictive federal class action
jurisprudence to defeat proposed class certification.148 CAFA‘s
legislative history clearly suggests that the legislative purpose in
enacting CAFA was to provide corporate defendants with an alternative
forum to—and some relief from—state court venues that unfairly
favored class action plaintiffs.
In the same period that federal courts began to tighten the
requirements for certification of litigation classes, federal courts also
embarked on an examination of the concept of the settlement class.149
The debate over the viability and criteria for settlement classes
ultimately culminated in the Supreme Court‘s dual decisions in Amchem
in 1997150 and Ortiz in 1999.151 As is well-known, although the
Supreme Court upheld the concept of a settlement class, the Court
rejected the Amchem and Ortiz global asbestos settlement agreements
that the district courts had approved in those two litigations. The
Court‘s Amchem decision set forth important due process requirements
(and constraints) on Rule 23(b)(3) settlement classes,152 while the
Court‘s Ortiz decision likewise set forth three important criteria for Rule

claimants); In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing class
certification of a nationwide class of hemophiliacs in the so-called ―tainted blood products‖ litigation).
147. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006) (concerning CAFA removal provision).
149. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d
133 (3d Cir. 1995) (examining the concept of a ―settlement class‖ and setting forth requirements for
court approval of a settlement class).
150. Amchem Prods, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
151. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
152. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613.
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23(b)(1)(B) limited fund settlement classes.153 In addition, the Court in
Ortiz reiterated the important due process requirements it had set forth
two years earlier in its Amchem decision.154
For the purposes of this discussion, the importance of the Amchem
and Ortiz decisions is that the Supreme Court made it more difficult for
the practicing bar to negotiate and resolve aggregate litigation, by
setting forth clear due process and other requirements that litigants must
satisfy and that courts must consider in order to approve a proposed
class action settlement.155 Moreover, the Ortiz decision virtually
ensured that few, if any, class actions would be approved under the Rule
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund provision.156
By the end of the twentieth century, two class action trends were
apparent: plaintiffs could be expected to encounter significant obstacles
to certifying litigation classes in federal courts, and both sides of the
docket would most likely encounter considerable impediments to
negotiating and consummating class action settlements. While the first
trend gave an advantage to the corporate defense bar sued in massive
class litigation, the second trend clearly was problematic for the plaintiff
and defense bars when both sides mutually desired settlement of
massive litigation. The Amchem and Ortiz decisions also presented
obstacles to federal judges who wished to expeditiously resolve massive
litigation on their dockets, limiting the ability of judges to approve class
action settlements subjected to due process objections.
Against this backdrop—and after CAFA in 2005 ensured that most
class litigation would be resolved in federal court—the interests of the
plaintiff and defense bars (and the judiciary) converged to encourage
development of a means for resolving complex litigation outside the
confines of the Amchem and Ortiz decisions. Thus, after 2005,
corporate defendants involved in massive litigation led the way in
favoring the multidistrict litigation statute as mechanism for resolving
complex cases. While in many instances corporate defendants sued in
class litigation continue to oppose class certification, in other instances
when corporate defendants have strategically decided to settle their

153. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838–39.
154. Id. at 845.
155. Ironically, it is precisely these requirements and constraints that the Supreme Court has set
forth in Amchem and Ortiz that Judge Weinstein, in his Zyprexa orders, has used as a justification and
rationale for use of the concept of the quasi-class action. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). In other words, Judge Weinstein views the Amchem and Ortiz decisions
as obstacles to accomplishing settlements unbounded by the rule of law.
156. See, e.g., In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2005) (overturning class
certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nationwide punitive damage tobacco class action based on theory of
constitutional limits on the amount of punitive damages that may be imposed on a defendant;
requirements of Ortiz not satisfied in proposed class).
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potential liabilities, they have clearly favored MDL auspices as the
means for accomplishing global peace.
Thus, whereas MDL procedure had once been something of a judicial
backwater for large-scale litigation, MDL procedure rapidly has
emerged in the twenty-first century as the preferred procedural umbrella
under which to resolve aggregate litigation. Now, the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation almost immediately creates an MDL after the
emergence of a defective products or pharmaceutical litigation.157 For
the most part, the plaintiffs‘ bar—frustrated at its inability to gain class
certification in many federal courts—has willingly gone along with this
shift in litigation strategy. In addition, MDL courts also have embraced
their authority as an efficient way of docket-clearing massive litigation.
C. The Illegitimate Expansion of the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to
Embrace the Quasi-Class Action
The shift in the twenty-first century of aggregate litigation to MDL
courts under MDL auspices is somewhat ironic in light of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation‘s historical resistance to creating mass
tort MDLs.158 The MDL Panel accomplished a major doctrinal breakthrough in 1991, when the MDL Panel reversed its longstanding
opposition to creation of an asbestos MDL. 159 The panel‘s authorization
of an asbestos MDL finally encouraged subsequent MDL panels to
make increasing use of MDL procedures to resolve aggregate litigation.
The rationales justifying the MDL‘s panel‘s reversal of course in
1991 are worth noting, because the panel sounded the themes of judicial
expediency, pragmatism, and fundamental justice in light of increasing
docket congestion inspired by large-scale litigation. Thus, the panel
noted that ―we are persuaded that this [asbestos] litigation has reached a
magnitude, not contemplated in the record before us in 1977, that
threatens the administration of justice and that requires a new
streamlined approach.‖160 In a similar vein, the panel indicated the
following:
157. This trend towards rapid creation of MDL forums for massive cases holds true for other
types of class litigation, including securities and antitrust cases.
158. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., ―Dalkon Shield‖ IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 610 F. Supp. 1099
(J.P.M.D.L. 1985) (declining to create an MDL for Dalkon Shield litigation); In re Asbestos School
Prods. Liab. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 713 (J.P.M.D.L. 1985) (declining to create School Asbestos MDL); In
re Ortho Pharm. ―Lippes Loop‖ Prods. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 1073 (J.DP.M.D.L. 1978) (declining to
create an MDL for Lippes Loop IUD litigation); In re Asbestos and Asbestos Insulation Material Prods.
Liab. Litig., 431 F. Supp. 906 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (declining to create an asbestos MDL).
159. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.D.L. 1991) (authorizing
creation of an asbestos MDL after five previous refusals by MDL panels to authorize creation of an
asbestos MDL).
160. Id. at 418.
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The heyday of individual adjudication of asbestos mass tort lawsuits had
long passed. . . . The reasons are obvious; the complexity of asbestos
cases cases makes them too expensive to litigate; costs are exacerbated
when each individual has to prove his or her claim de novo; high
transaction costs reduce the recovery available to successful plaintiffs;
and the sheer number of asbestos cases pending nationwide threatens to
deny justice and compensation to many deserving claimants if each claim
is handled individually. The backlog is eroding a fundamental aspiration
of our judicial system to provide equality of treatment for similarly
situated persons.161

The panels‘ new-found embrace of the MDL approach to resolving
mass tort litigation in 1991 has inspired paradoxical, unintended
consequences. On the one hand, the panel‘s 1991 decision authorizing
creation of a nationwide asbestos MDL opened the floodgates to
numerous, subsequent mass tort (and other) MDL litigations.162 On the
other hand, it is worth remembering that the 1991 asbestos MDL was
the incubator of the infamous Georgine global asbestos settlement,163
which the Supreme Court repudiated in its 1997 Amchem decision.
Ironically, then, the creation of the1991 asbestos MDL contained the
seeds of its own destruction.
Nonetheless, since 1991 the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
has been motivated to create MDLs for almost all massive litigation that
emerges on the federal docket. Along with the increase in MDL
proceedings, federal courts also have experienced a concomitant
expansion of judicial authority in overseeing and managing MDL
litigation.164 Whereas in the first three decades of MDL history the
MDL forum was perceived as a successful venue for resolving massive
litigation, the usual auspices for ultimately resolving such litigation
under an MDL umbrella was through the class action mechanism.165
Thus, after an MDL court managed pretrial discovery and motions
practice, these efforts often resulted either in a class certification

161. Id. at 419 (internal citations omitted).
162. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.33 (2004) (citing numerous mass
tort and other MDLs).
163. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing approval of
global asbestos settlement class); Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(approving of asbestos settlement).
164. For example, MDL judges can oversee test-cases of selected cases within the MDL, and can
coordinate resolution of similar cases with state court judges. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH), supra note 162 at § 22.36.
165. Id; see also id. at n.1149 (noting that it is still an unresolved question whether, after
certifying a class action in an MDL proceeding, an MDL court may then retain the class action for trial
itself). In 1998, the Supreme Court held that an MDL court had no authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to
transfer an MDL case to itself for trial. Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg, Wiess, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26 (1998).
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motion,166 or in class settlement to be finalized and approved under the
class action rule.167
In the post-CAFA litigation landscape, however, while MDL forums
have continued to provide fruitful venues for resolving aggregate
litigation, some MDL judges and the parties involved now eschew the
class action settlement within the MDL. In contrast to past practice, and
with the tactic encouragement and complicity of MDL judges, selfinterested parties instead now use MDL forums as means to negotiate,
consummate, and finalize private deals outside the confines of the class
action rule. The MDL procedural mechanism, then, has been co-opted
into a useful tool for settling massive claims without the constraints
imposed by class action procedure. The Vioxx and Zyprexa deals are
perhaps the premier illustrations of precisely this phenomenon.
*

*

*

The MDL statute and MDL procedure was never intended to confer
such broad power and authority on a federal court to provide judicial
cover for privately negotiated backroom settlement deals that do not
comport with the rule of law, are subject to scant checks for abuse or
due process violations, and that resolve the claims of perhaps thousands
or hundreds of thousands of absent claimants. This, however, is
precisely the legacy of the quasi-class action.
The MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, actually describes a meager and
vague set of powers for MDL judges.168 The statute indicates that when
civil actions involving ―one or more common questions of fact‖ are
pending in different district courts, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
litigation may transfer such cases to any district ―for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.‖169 The statute further states that
MDL judges ―may exercise the powers of a district judge in any district
for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated or

166. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX II, & Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab.
Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev’d sub nom. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires
Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002).
167. See, e.g., In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330 (N.D. Ohio 2001)
(certifying settlement class); In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1203, 99-20593, 2000 WL
1222042 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (certifying settlement class).
168. Almost the entire MDL statute describes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and
how the Panel is constituted, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d); the grounds for initiation and creation of an MDL, 28
U.S.C. § 1407(b), (c); review of orders issues by an MDL judge, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e); and the limitation
excluding trial in the MDL forum, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). The statute also contains miscellaneous
sections delineating civil action that may or may not be subject to MDL proceedings. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(g)–(h) (2006).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
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consolidated pretrial proceedings.‖170 That is the extent of powers
authorized to MDL transferee judges under the MDL statute. Over the
past five decades, MDL judges have exercised authority to decide
motions to remand cases from the MDL, coordinate and consolidate
cases pending in different districts, identify differences in applicable
law, and seek information from parties as to the status of cases in order
to determine how to proceed with pretrial discovery and other
motions.171
In addition, MDL judges have exercised authority to dispose of cases
by ruling on the merits, by granting summary judgment. More recently,
MDL judges have exercised authority to carve out limited issues classes
to resolve common issues or try test cases originally filed in the
transferee court or refilled in the transferee court.172 Summarizing the
scope of judicial authority of an MDL judge, however, the FJC‘s
Manual for Complex Litigation simply concludes:
The transferee judge usually supervises discovery, decides motions, and,
if called for, decides whether to certify a class action. Under the
decentralized approach, the transferee judge would then remand the cases
to their original districts for trial . . . . In other cases, grants of summary
judgment or approvals of settlement have obviated remand to the
transferee courts.173

Thus, the express text of the MDL statute and the history of MDL
procedure has been one of limited delegation of authority of a federal
MDL judge to consolidate and coordinate pre-trial proceedings. Over
time, this authority has expanded to encourage settlements under MDL
auspices, but always within the purview of the class action rule. After
the Supreme Court in Amchem repudiated a global class action
settlement consummated in the asbestos MDL—largely because of due
process defects—the Court inadvertently spurred on a movement by
actors seeking global resolution of large-scale liabilities to retain the
good offices of the MDL proceeding, but to avoid the class action rule
altogether in achieving ultimate settlement. Hence, in the post-Amchem
era, it is not surprising to see the embrace of the quasi-class action by
Judge Weinstein in the Zyprexa litigation, and Judge Fallon in the Vioxx
litigation, as a means of accomplishing an end-run around the rule of
law. In the realm of unintended consequences, this cannot possibly be
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (emphasis added). The statute also indicates that the MDL Panel ―may
prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with the Acts of Congress and the federal
Rules of Civil procedure.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). This, however, is a power of the Panel, rather than the
MDL transferee judge.
171. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 162, at § 22.36.
172. Id. (citing examples).
173. Id.
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what the Court intended in its Amchem and Ortiz decisions.
III. THE QUASI-CLASS ACTION AS THE EMBODIMENT OF LAWLESS
AGGREGATE CLAIMS RESOLUTION
The Zyprexa and Vioxx litigations present two contrasting examples
of use of the quasi-class action concept. Arguably, Judge Weinstein‘s
invocation of the quasi-class action construct in the Zyprexa litigation
illustrates an admirable application of the concept; Judge Weinstein
employed this theory to enable him to adjust the private attorney fee
contracts that would have extracted high contingency fees from
claimants. In this instance, Judge Weinstein‘s invocation of the quasiclass action was used for a commendable end, which was to protect
claimants from excessive attorney fees.
On the other hand, Judge Fallon invoked the quasi-class action
conceit to enable him to issue post-settlement orders that affected the
rights of non-settling parties; in exercising this authority under the rubric
of the quasi-class action, Judge Fallon became an active participant in
enforcing provisions of a private settlement deal that had not been
subject to class fairness scrutiny, which orders resulted in the dismissal
of certain claimants‘ claims. Judge Fallon‘s use of the quasi-class action
conceit in the Vioxx litigation, then, was a far cry from Judge
Weinstein‘s invocation of the concept in Zyprexa, and represents a
troubling expansion of the concept. In this instance, deployment of the
quasi-class action concept was used to harm the interests of at least
some segment of the universe of potential Vioxx claimants.
As discussed above, it is easy to understand why various actors
involved in complex aggregate litigation have embraced MDL
proceedings and the concept of the quasi-class action. Thus, plaintiffs
and defendant may now mutually enjoy the good offices of an MDL
judge to settle massive liabilities without concern that any agreement
they reach will have to undergo the rigorous certification and fairness
analysis required by the formal class action rule. In this regard, Judge
Weinstein was shrewdly correct in his appreciation that the Amchem and
Ortiz decisions created impediments to resolution of mass tort litigation.
Instead, parties involved in MDL proceedings now can simply go off
and cut whatever deal satisfies the interests of the attorneys involved in
negotiations, without fear of judicial check.
On the other hand, it could not possibly have been the intention of the
Supreme Court, in deciding Amchem and Ortiz, to encourage litigants to
simply circumvent the mandates of those decisions by creating a new
pseudo concept that sounds like a class action, but evades all due
process requirements. The quasi-class action represents the worst-
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possible outcome after Amchem and Ortiz: aggregate class settlements
not subject to class action due process requirements.
It is well worth recalling that the underlying Amchem litigation
involved a controversial narrative of a private, backroom collusive
settlement that benefitted some class members at the expense of others,
resolved the defendants‘ massive asbestos liabilities, and amply
rewarded class counsel with attorney fees. The backroom, collusive
nature of the so-called Georgine deal inspired a firestorm of criticism,174
and ultimately caused the Supreme Court to repudiate the deal in
Amchem, and to reject a similarly infected deal in Ortiz. Yet, in spite of
Amchem and Ortiz, with the advent of the Zyprexa and Vioxx deals, we
have returned to an era of back-room settlements that inspired such
controversy in the 1990s.
The objection may be raised that there is nothing wrong with
privately negotiated settlement deals. Indeed, private settlements
frequently are accomplished by counsel, or under the umbrella of
mediation or arbitration. However, in ordinary litigation the client is
actually present to oversee settlement negotiations, and to modify,
approve, or disapprove a proposed settlement. In the mediation or
arbitration, the client gives prior consent to be bound by the
determinations of an impartial intermediary.
Modern MDL proceedings that consolidate thousands of claims, on
the other hand, are unlike other private settlement auspices. Detached
from class action status, claimants who are the subject of an MDL
proceeding are largely unmoored from representation. While class
certification, at a minimum, ensures adequate representation at the
outset of proceedings—both by adequate representatives and class
counsel—individuals involved in an MDL proceeding have no assurance
that anyone is protecting their interests. Furthermore, there are few
mechanisms that provide claimants with meaningful opportunities to
consent to ongoing negotiations or the results of negotiations.
Thus, MDL settlement negotiations that are conducted outside the
auspices of the class action mechanism encourage precisely the type of
self-dealing and collusion among the attorneys which became the object
of criticism in Amchem. With judicial embrace of the notion of a quasiclass action, we have returned to a pre-Amchem era of lawless aggregate
claims resolution. Worse still, under the rubric of the quasi-class action,
the federal judiciary now provides an equally quasi-judicial imprimatur
to such dealings.
174. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995); Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass
Torts, And “Settlement Class Actions”: An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1995) (devoting
entire issue to critical commentary of the Georgine settlement).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In 2009, discussing his role as the Special Master overseeing the
World Trade Center Victims‘ Compensation Fund,175 Ken Feinberg used
this opportunity to embrace the concept of the quasi-class action.176 As
the administrator of both the WTC Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility,177 it is easy to appreciate Ken Feinberg‘s endorsement of the
concept of the quasi-class action, with its free-form approach to
aggregate claims resolution.
Given his prestige and authority as a special master involved in
numerous large-scale litigations, Ken Feinberg‘s embrace and
endorsement of the concept of the quasi-class action ought to be viewed
with some alarm. Even more troubling is the support and adoption of
the quasi-class action concept in other quarters,178 with suggestions that
the authority of MDL judges ought to be expanded in significant ways,
but amendment of the MDL statute.
Private parties should not be permitted to hijack MDL procedure,
either to negotiate away their liabilities under the cloak of law, or to gain
ample attorney fees. MDL procedure should not be usurped to permit
back-room deals consummated free from the constraints of due process
that are intended to protect absent individuals. The current MDL statute
and the history of MDL proceedings do not support expansive powers of
federal judges overseeing such consolidated cases to provide judicial
cover for privately negotiated class action deals not subject to class
action due process requirements. Moreover, the MDL statute does not
provide authority for an MDL judge to exercise power over recalcitrant
175. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115
Stat. 230 (2001) codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006); Kenneth R. Feinberg et al., FINAL REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf.
176. Kenneth Feinberg, Transparency and Civil Justice: The Internal and External Value of
Sunlight, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 476. (2009) (citing to In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp.
230 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)). Feinberg stated:
Read Judge Weinstein‘s Zyprexa opinion last year. He‘s coined a new phrase: a ―quasi-class,‖
mainly the principles governing due process and notice in Rule 23 may be, and should be,
transferrable to any aggregative claim, even if it‘s not a Rule 23 class, dealing with notification
of claimants, legal fees, opt-out rights or rights not to participate in an aggregative settlement; a
very valuable opinion discussing how in the twenty-first century some of the principles
governing notice in Rule 23 ought to also be deemed important in a non-23 aggregative
situation. He was focusing on the Zyprexa case involving the settlement of 700 MDL non-class
claims.
177. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility website is located at http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com. The
website
includes
a
―Frequently
Asked
Questions‖
section,
located
at
http://gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq. See Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast
Claims Facility as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Litigation—A Fund Too Far, 78 LA. L. REV. 819
(2011).
178. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION ch. 3 (2010).
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claimants who object to private deals consummated outside the purview
of the class action rule.
The notion of the quasi-class action is not justified by statute, rule,
precedent, or any other authority. It is a judicially-created label
intended to provide judges overseeing MDL or other aggregate
proceedings with an aura of judicial legitimacy. The quasi-class action
is the antithesis of the rule of law, providing instead a mantle of legality
to unbounded, freewheeling aggregate claims resolution. As such, this
dubious doctrine ought to be repudiated.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012

41

